Abstract. The present study focuses on the defining characteristic and variegation of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) as laid out by Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan (1182Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan ( -1251 in the first eight verses of the 'Direct Perception' chapter in his Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter. As is well known, direct perception along with inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) make up the two means of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) according the Buddhist system of epistemology initiated by the renowned Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (circa 480-540) and expanded and further developed by his indirect follower Dharmakīrti (mid-7 th century). Each of these means of valid cognition is restricted to its respective objects (prameya, gzhal bya); the specifically characterised object (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) is the object of a direct perception and the generally characterised object (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is the object for an inference.
Whereas Sakya Paṇḍita's (hereafter Sa Paṇ) efforts to protect Tibet from a Mongol invasion are known and have long established his importance in the political and diplomatic realm, the depth of his intellectual prowess and ability to synthesise IndoTibetan Buddhist epistemology, culminating in the Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter (hereafter TMRG), 1 remain under-appreciated. According to tradition, Sa Paṇ commenced the study of epistemology at the age of 17 to 19 (ca. 1199-1201) while still a lay follower (upāsaka). Sa Paṇ initially undertook the study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya (hereafter P.Vin) with Mthur-ston Gzhon-nu seng-ge and sometime later with Rstags Dbang-phyug seng-ge (cf. Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975; van der Kuijp 1979; van der Kujip 1983, 97-9) . Sa Paṇ was not satisfied with what he was being taught by these teachers; he thought that foreign (non-Buddhist) elements had crept into the teaching and that the true intent of Dharmakīrti was not being taught. 2 Due to his dissatisfaction with what he was being taught, Sa Paṇ decided to travel to Chu-mig ring mo, where the great Kashmiri Paṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadra (?-?1225) had taken up residence and teaching. Śākyaśrībhadra arrived in Tibet in 1204 after fleeing India as a result of invading Muslim forces destroying Buddhist monasteries circa 1197, including Nālandā where he was the last abbot. 3 Arriving at Chu-mig ring mo in 1205, Sa Paṇ studied various topics within the field of Buddhist epistemology under the tutelage of Śākyaśrībhadra, as well as others in the entourage such as the Nepali Pandita Sanghaśrī (Saṃghaśrī), Danaśrī (Dānaśīla), and Sugataśrī. Eventually, circa 1210, Sa Paṇ collaborated with Śākyaśrībhadra to retranslate Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavarttika (hereafter PV). The PV superseded the P.Vin as the foremost logical text in Tibet as a result of this retranslation (Roerich 1976, 335 ; see also van der Kujip 1979, 409; Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975; Jackson 1987, 25) . 4 In 1219, after being exposed to and studying Buddhist epistemology for approximately 22 years, at the age of 38 Sa Paṇ decided to compose the TMRG without relying on any of the preceding Sanskrit or Tibetan commentarial literature on Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's work. Sa Paṇ employed the primary texts authored by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to substantiate his points. Through composing the TMRG, Sa Paṇ hoped to establish the system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in Tibet and to correct what he considered to be the improper understanding of the meaning of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya (often simply referred to the Pramāṇa Sūtra in Tibet; hereafter PS) and Dharmakīrti's Seven Texts (sde-bdun). 5 As noted by van der Kuijp, by means of the TMRG, Sa Paṇ also expected to refute those Tibetan scholars who viewed the 2 There is certainly reason to suspect that Sa Paṇ was dissatisfied due to non-Buddhist elements being present in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti's work. While Śāntarakṣita (725-83) and were instrumental in establishing Buddhist epistemology during the first period of Buddhism in Tibet, their lineage was broken at the close of the first period. During the second period of Buddhism in Tibet, Rngog lo-tsa ba Blo-ldan shes rab (1059-1109) played a pivotal role in once again establishing the teaching of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya. One of Rngog lo-tsa ba's primary teachers was the Kashmiri logician Bhagiraja, who was a late convert to Buddhism. Therefore, some remnants of Hindu logic are said to have remained in his understanding and instruction of Buddhist logic (see Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975) .
3 Circa 1197 Ikhtiyara Uddin Muhammad ibn-Bakhtayar destroyed two great Buddhist universities, Nālandā and Vikramaśīla. Śākyaśrībhadra departed Nālandā after the raid by ibn-Bakhtayar and went to Jaggadala Mahāvihāra (Bengal) where he stayed for approximately three years until that state fell, whereupon he went to Nepal. Circa 1200 the Tibetan scholar Khro-phu invited Śākyaśrībhadra to travel to Tibet (see Dhar 2004, 35) .
4 It should also be noted that per Jackson 1987, 35, n. 35 , Śākyaśrībhadra served as the upādhyāya in the ordination of Sa Paṇ as a monk circa 1208.
5 In addition to the PV and the P.Vin, the seven texts of Dharmakīrti also include the following: Nyāyabindu (rigs pa thigs pa); Sambandhaparīkṣā ('brel ba brtag pa); Hetubindu (gtan tshigs thigs pa); Vādanyāya (rtsod pa'i tshigs rigs pa); Santānāntara-siddhi (rgyud gzhan grub pa).
works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti through the influence of Rngog Lo-tsa-ba (van der Kujip 1983, 101) . 6 The TMRG critically comments on the views of two of the most renowned adherents of Rngog Lo tsa ba's interpretation, to wit, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-69) and Gtsang nag pa brtson 'grus seng ge (12 th century). While neither Phya pa (sometimes Cha ba) nor Gtsang nag pa are specifically mentioned by Sa Paṇ in relation to the eight verses under consideration either in the TMRG or his Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter rang 'grel (hereafter TMRGRG), Go-rams pa directly refers to Phya pa as the target of Sa Paṇ's criticism with regard to his explanation of the opening verse in the 'Direct Perception' chapter. 7
Root text and commentaries
With respect to textual materials currently extant, Sa Paṇ's TMRG, along with his TMRGRG, represent the first effort in Tibet to focus on and examine the considerable earlier body of Indian works concentrating on Buddhist logic and epistemology. While Sa Pan's abilities were celebrated and his re-translation of Dharmakīrti's PV with Sakyaśrī was highly regarded, the depth and scope of Sa Paṇ's genius as reflected in the TMGR was not immediately forthcoming. Near-term Tibetan scholars following soon after Sa Paṇ viewed this work skeptically and interest in the TMRG dimmed in the 13 th and 14 th centuries. Only at the conclusion of the 14 th century and the outset of the 15 th century did interest in the TMRG begin in earnest following the appearance of Gyag ston sangs rgyas dpal's (1348-1414) Sde bdun gyi dgongs 'grel tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi de kho na nyid gsal bar byed pa rigs pa'i 'od stong (Radiating a Thousand Lights, (A Commentary) Illumining the Suchness of (Sa Paṇ's) Tshadma rigs pa'i gter, A Commentary on the Intention of (Dharmakīrti's) Seven Texts) (see Jackson 1987, 137-38) . In this work, Gyag ston chastised Tibetan scholars for not understanding Dharmakīrti's system and those Tibetans who followed Phya pa's Bsdus pa (Summaries), which he believed misrepresented Dharmakīrti's system and Sa Paṇ's synthesis of that system (Dreyfus 1997, 24) .
The TMRG consists of eleven chapters (rab byed) that constitute a topical commentary analysing the main philosophical issues encountered in the works of 6 Cf. also van der Kuijp 1979, 409 regarding gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan's comment that Sa Paṇ composed the TMRG after concluding that Phya-pa's 'Summaries of Logic' (tshad bsdus) did not agree (mi mthun pa) with the basic texts (gzhung), i.e. the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 7 See Go-rams pa 1975, 125 , where Phya and others (phya pa sogs) are identified as those to whom Sa Paṇ aims his rejection of their defining characteristic (mthsan nyid, lakṣaṇa) of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) . See TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226 , where Sa Paṇ simply identifies generic Tibetans (bod rnams) as the subjects of his criticism. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 8 The TMRG, like other texts discussing issues relating to epistemology, is composed in extremely terse and didactic verse that presupposes the reader/audience possesses previous knowledge of the topic under examination. Without the aid of a commentary ('grel pa, vṛtti) , understanding the nuanced meaning and the philosophical background of a root text (mūla, rtsa) examining subjects such as direct perception or inference are unlikely. Therefore, in order to fully develop the intended meaning and context of Sa Pan's discussion of the defining characteristic (mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa) and variegation (dbye ba) of direct perception as presented in the first eight verses of his 'Direct Perception' chapter, two commentaries on the TMRG are employed in this investigation: Sa Paṇ's own auto-commentary entitled Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter rang 'grel (TMRGRG) and the sub-commentary by Kunmkhyen Go-rams pa Bsod nams seng ge 10 While the above-named commentaries, as well as others, are important, Go-rams-pa's TMRGDG holds a prominent place within the Sa skya tradition and is considered to most clearly present the ideas of Sa Paṇ. The TMRGDG is still included as a central part of the curriculum in the education of Sa skya monks in the Sa skya monastic institutions such as Sakya College. 11 In total, the 'Direct Perception' chapter consists of 153 verses covering the full gamut of issues surrounding the topic of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa). 12 While a skilled translator may possibly extract a cogent rendition of each verse Sa Paṇ employs in the 'Direct Perception' chapter, only with the aid of a commentary, in this instance Sa Paṇ's Rang 'Grel and Go-rams pa's sub-commentary (TMRGDG), can one gain the contextual and subtextual granularity supporting the intent of each verse. As the tip of the iceberg represents merely a minute visible aspect of the supporting massive ice formation beneath the surface of the water, so too does each verse finely crafted by Sa Paṇ with economy represent the pointy tip of a vast subtext and context of supporting arguments.
Sectional titles (sa bcad)
Go-rams pa's TMRGDG closely follows Sa Paṇ's auto-commentary, expanding and amplifying where he deems necessary, sometimes adding fuller context to a topic merely mentioned in Sa Paṇ's auto-commentary. Both the TMRGRG and the TMRGDG provide sectional titles (sa bcad) that serve as useful guides to nicely segment the root text verses into digestible focused units. The sectional titles specifically denote the issues that Sa Paṇ intends to address within each verse or groups of verses. In order to assist in clarifying the context and subtext surrounding the eight verses under consideration, the sectional titles will be included. In addition to clarifying the discussion, presenting the sectional titles provides an excellent example as to how this compositional device was utilised within this genre. The sectional titles within the TMRGRG and the TMRGDG are generally consistent, with Go-rams pa providing additional subdivisions in certain instances, again to aid clarification.
While the exact procedure for writing the sectional titles can vary, it generally amounts to providing a series of titles such as 'the first (providing the specific topic under consideration) has three sections', then naming the sub-topics that will be addressed. Later when arriving at the place in the text where that specific topic is to be discussed, Sa Paṇ or Go-rams pa will often simply say 'The second is…' (without restating the specific issue); in order to assist in clarity the full sectional titles will be inserted both when they are originally referred to as well as when the actual topic is discussed. Both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa indicate that the eleven chapters of the TMRG root text are divided into two overall sections: 1. to ascertain the definitive conclusion in this system, having countered the universal as the knowable, and 2. to ascertain the essence of the means of valid cognition as the knowing agent. 13
Chapters one through seven of the TMRG are examined under the first section and chapters eight through eleven are discussed under the second section. 14 The second section is further divided into 2.A. to make clear the exposition of the defining characteristic, and 2.B. to make clear the purpose of each illustration (i.e., mgnon sum and rjes dpag). 15 Therefore chapter eight, 'Defining Characteristic' (mtshan nyid), of the TMRG is discussed under rubric 2.A., while our 'Direct Perception', chapter 9 (as well as chapters 10 and 11, 'Inference for Oneself' [rang don rjes dpag] and 'Inference for Others' [gzhan don rjes dpag] respectively), comes under 2.B.; taken as a whole, all 153 verses of the 'Direct Perception' chapter provide an in-depth examination of the majority of the issues surrounding the place and function of direct perception as presented in the system put forth by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. With regard to the 'Direct Perception' chapter presented as the first topic under 2.B., both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa further divide the TMRG's examination of this subject into the following three primary areas: While Sa Paṇ simply directs his criticism at Tibetan scholars (bod rnams) in general, in the TMRGDG Go-rams pa distinctly identifies the intended target of Sa Paṇ's criticism at Phya pa chos kyi seng ge and others (phya pa sogs).
In verse one Sa Paṇ is addressing his belief that Phya pa and others have incorrectly divided 'a direct perception' (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) and 'a direct perception as a means of valid cognition' (mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa pramāṇa). According to both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa, Phya pa et al. have explained the defining characteristic of a pratyakṣa as a cognition which is 'free from conceptual thought and without error' (rtog bral ma 'khrul pa, kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam); while at the same time they have wrongly noted a 'direct perception as a means of valid cognition' as a pratyakṣa 'eliminating the superimposition (adhyāropa) through experiencing an object not previously comprehended'. 20 For the Sakya writers following Sa Paṇ (sa lugs), Phya pa's division is wrong for two primary reasons. First, the basic texts (gzhung), in this case Dignāga's PS and Dharmakīrti's PV, do not indicate a division into pratyakṣa and pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. Second, within a mere pratyakṣa, a cognition eliminating the superimposition without the presence of a cognitive operation of exclusion (rnam bcad) towards an object not previously comprehended is not possible. Where there is a cognition eliminating the superimposition, there is necessarily a cognitive operation of exclusion. The cognitive operation of exclusion is a conceptual activity and therefore cannot be present in a pratyakṣa because it violates the requirement that a pratyakṣa must be without conceptual thought (rtog bral; nirvikalpa).
2.B.1.A.1.B. Establishing (bzhag) our own defining characteristic of direct perception
After delimiting the wrong defining characteristic of pratyakṣa put forth by others, Go-rams pa notes that the next issue concerning Sa Paṇ is establishment of their correct defining characteristic of direct perception, which will focus on two topics: With regard to the defining characteristic as laid out by Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa comments that both aspects of the defining characteristic are employed when one is concerned with dispelling misunderstandings (log rtog sel ba). Alternatively, when one is concerned with eliminating dissimilar types (rigs mi mthun sel ba), 'a cognition that is without error' can be employed as the defining characteristic of pratyakṣa. 23 Furthermore, while citing Dharmakīrti's P.Vin ('Pratyakṣa' chapter, 4.a.) on the definition of direct perception (to wit, mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba), Go-rams pa reiterates that the defining characteristic of direct perception as a means of valid cognition (mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) is the same as the defining characteristic of direct perception. Go-rams pa highlights that the definition of direct perception offered by Dharmakīrti is recognised as being a means of valid cognition because it not stated that there is a different defining characteristic regarding mngon sum tshad ma (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) . 24
2.B.1.A.1.B.2. Ascertainment of the purpose of that defining characteristic
The TMRGDR notes that in order to ascertain the correct defining characteristic it is necessary to understand the purpose of the definition as presented. To accomplish this, Go-rams pa outlines three areas that need to be reviewed, to wit, A. ascertaining the meaning of 'free from conceptual thought'; B. ascertaining the meaning of 'without error'; C. ascertaining the purpose of both 'without conceptual and without error'. 25
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.A. Ascertaining the meaning of 'free from conceptual thought' (Verse III)
When initiating the examination of the meaning of 'free from conceptual thought', Sa Paṇ's TMRGRD comments that the defining characteristic of conceptual thought explained in the scripture (lung, āgama) as 'all conceptual thought are erroneous' is not only referring to a 'course cognition' (sems rtsing), such as cognitive acts and mental states (sems dang sems byung). 26 In the TMRG, Verse III of the 'Pratyakṣa' chapter, Sa Paṇ indicates another variety of kalpanā (rtog pa) as that stipulated by Dharmakīrti with respect to its absence in direct perception, stating 'conceptual thought apprehends the object associated with words'. 27 In commenting on Sa Paṇ's Verse III, Go-rams pa follows Sa Paṇ and states that the conceptual thought that should be absent in pratyakṣa is the conceptual thought that apprehends the object associated with words (sgra don, śabda-artha). 28 / de nyid mngon sum tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyang yin te / rnam nges las / mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba / zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /de nyid tshad ma yin pa'i dbang du byas nas / mngon sum tshad ma la mtshan nyid gzhan ma gsungs pa'i phyir ro /.
25 Anent the issue of ascertaining the purpose of the two components of the direct perception, Sa Paṇ also notes that one examines both 'free from conceptual thought' and 'without error' when seeking the purpose of that definition depending on the terms. Cf 28 Go-rams pa paraphrases Sa Paṇ as follows: dang po la bral bya rtog pa ni / sgra don 'dzin pa'i rtog pa ste /, Go-rams pa 1975, 125.18 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 61b.6-62.a.1. As Gorams pa's comment suggests and as will be seen, there are numerous varieties of conceptual thought (rtog pa, kalpanā); in the current discussion it is that type of conceptual thought which is to be absent
In support of his presentation of conceptual thought and in acknowledment of the nuanced approach regarding conceptual thought, the TMRGRG, as well as Gorams pa's TMRGDG, cites the same two instances where Dharmakīrti presents two somewhat differing notions about what constitutes conceptual thought and seemingly should be absent in a direct perception; namely, PV ('Pratyakṣa' 287.a-b):
Whatever the cognition and wherever its apprehension of the object associated with words, in that there is said to be conceptual thought. 29 And in the P.Vin, while commenting on 'Pratyakṣa' 4.b, stating: As presented in Obermiller 1931, 45, Dharmakīrti's P.Vin can be viewed as a commentary on Dignāga' PS: '"The Pramāṇa-viniścaya", says the Kashmirian Pandit Jñānaśrī, "is not to be regarded as a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya; nevertheless, I shall elucidate its theory". The teacher Dharmottara, on the contrary says it is a commentary on the work in question, and this opinion is to be regarded as correct'. Therefore, it may be possible to view Dharmakīrti's P.Vin 'Prat.' 4.b comment regarding 'conceptual thought' as referring to Dignāga's PS 'Prat.' verse 2.c-d: min dang rigs sbyor ba yi / rtog pa dang bral mngon sum mo // (Direct perception is free from conceptual thought that adds a name, (nāma, ming) and class (jāti, rigs), etc). While not actually defining 'conceptual As Dreyfus rightly points out, in laying out the above two notions, Dharmakīrti indicated the close connection between conceptual thought and universals on the one hand and with language in the second instance. While the two notions do not conflict, they do tend to emphasise different aspects of conceptual thought (Dreyfus 1997, 220) . In the first instance cited from PV, Dharmakīrti points out the object of conceptual thought as an object that is associated with words and can be viewed as a universal (spyi, sāmānya). In his 11 th century work entitled Tarkabhāṣā, Mokṣākaragupta notes that this variety of conceptual thought is evidenced by a clever man's comprehension in the form 'this is a jar' (Kajiyama 1966, 41) . This notion falls squarely in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition, which has the universal as the object of the conceptual inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) and the particular (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) as the object of a non-conceptual perception. In his later P.Vin, Dharmakīrti points out the relationship between conceptual thought and expression (brjod pa, abhilāpa).
Even though Sa Paṇ acknowledged the two significant aspects of conceptual thought as presented by Dharmakīrti in relation to pratyakṣa (mngon sum) by referring to verse PV 'Pratyakṣa' 287 and P.Vin 'Pratyakṣa' 4, he seemingly took the positive step to emphasise the defining characteristic of conceptual thought as presented in the PV, in his Verse III of the TMRG's 'Mngon Sum' chapter: conceptual thought apprehends 'the object associated with words' (sgra don, śabdārtha), thereby apparently signaling this aspect of conceptual thought as representing Dharmakīrti's focus in this case.
With respect to the notions of conceptual thought presented in the PV and P.Vin, considerable discussion ensued about how to properly interpret śabdārtha (sgra don) as the defining characteristic of conceptual thought in the PV as well as the purpose of yogya (rung ba) (capable) noted as a characteristic of conceptual thought in the P.Vin. While neither Sa Paṇ nor Go-rams pa dwell on these two issues at this point in the 'Direct Perception' chapter, they do address the issues and state their positions. As would be expected, when Sa Paṇ elaborates on Dharmakīrti's two explanations of conceptual thought in his 13 th century TMRGRD, he focuses on early Indian and Tibetan authors such as Śāntarakṣita and Phya pa respectively. And by the time Gorams pa addresses these issues in the 15 th century, he not only includes the earlier references denoted by Sa Paṇ, but there are indications that he also takes into account developments put forth by Tibetan Ge luk pa writers such as Rgyal tshab dar ma rin thought', but rather laying out examples of what constitutes kalpanā, Dignāga's comment led to extensive criticism from opponents such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who claimed that the inclusion of jāti implied Dignāga's acceptance as of them as real. Dharmakīrti's PV's explanation rectifies this vulnerability by limiting 'conceptual thought' as being capable of being associated with verbalisation. While further discussion of this issue is beyond the present scope of this investigation, for a more detailed examination see Vyas 1991, 33-92. chen (1364-1432), Mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang po (1385-1438), and Dge 'dun grub pa .
Anent the defining characteristic of kalpanā as presented in PV 287 and in a possible rebuff of Phya pa, Sa Paṇ states that it is not necessary to include an objectuniversal (don spyi, artha sāmānya) as the object of conceptual thought in addition to the śabdārtha. 31 Sa Paṇ discredits the argument put forth by those who say that it is necessary to include the qualification that conceptual thought apprehends the object-universal (don spyi, artha sāmānya) in order to respond to those who argue that conceptual thought that apprehends the object associated with words (śabdārtha) does not cover the instance when non-Buddhists (mu stegs, tīrthika) accept that sense cognition possesses conceptual thought. Seemingly indicating that Dharmakīrti's verse is not meant to be all inclusive, Sa Paṇ notes that even if the above criticism is true, a similar criticism can be put forth concerning PV verse 287, when it is said that conceptual thought that apprehends the object associated with words (sdra don 'dzin pa) does not cover the case regarding the conceptual thought of one who is ignorant about conventional signs. 32 The issue of the 'conceptual thought of one who is ignorant of conventional signs', i.e. language, is more directly addressed, albeit briefly, when Sa Paṇ and Gorams pa examine the purported purpose concerning why Dharmakīrti includes the requirement 'capable' (rung ba, yogya) in the P.Vin's definition of conceptual thought, to wit, 'a cognition (in which a representation) is capable of being associated with verbalisation'. Initiating the discussion, Sa Paṇ, again employing the generic kha cig, notes that some scholars say Dharmakīrti utilised the phrase 'apprehension capable of being associated' ('drer rung 'dzin pa) with verbalisation in order to include in his definition the conceptual thought of one who is ignorant of conventional signs. Sa Paṇ points out that the above does not cover the case where there is in fact 'apprehension associating' ('dres pa 'dzin pa) with verbalisation. Acknowledging that some scholars say that there is no controversy (mi 'gal) by recognising the cognition in which there is in fact an 'apprehension associating' with verbalisation, Sa Paṇ concludes that there is no opposition regardless of whether the term 'capable' (rung) is included or not in the definition, since both instances are of a similar type (rigs gcig pa) in terms of constituting conceptual thought. 33 Elaborating on this issue, Go-rams pa more specifically comments that some Indians (rgya gar ba kha cig) (Śāntarakṣita, for instance) (Jha 1937 (Jha , verses 1214 , postulate that Dharmakīrti used the term 'capable' in order to include the conceptual thought-continuum of an infant (byis pa), who is ignorant of the meanings of words; the infant's thought process is not covered (ma khyab pa) by the definition which stipulates the 'cognition (possessing conceptual thought) that apprehends the object associated with words' (sgra don 'dzin pa'i blo). Furthermore, pointing out an alternative case similar to Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa utilises the example of an older man (rgan po) who does in fact have access to words (which are associated with the object). In this case, the older man's conceptual thought-continuum is not covered by the definition stipulating that a cognition is an 'apprehension capable' (rung ba 'dzin pa) of associating; since the older man's cognition does in fact have access to a cognition that possesses an apprehension associated ('dres pa 'dzin pa) with verbalisation. Regarding the definitions of conceptual thought that may include either the qualifier 'apprehension capable' (rung 'dzin pa) of associating or 'apprehension associating' ('dres pa 'dzin pa), for Go-rams pa, like Sa Paṇ, there is not fault in considering either as allowable with respect to utilising them as a characteristic of conceptual thought that should be absent in pratyakṣa. 34 After completing the overview regarding Sa Paṇ's qualifiers (rung 'dzin pa and 'dres pa 'dzin pa), Go-rams pa goes one step further and briefly annotates an expanded list of definitions of conceptual thought that can be equally considered as excludable in this system (bstan):
• a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-(universal) as associated; • a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-(universal) as capable of being associated; • a cognition that apprehends the object (associated) with words; • a cognition that apprehends an object-universal. In laying out the above differing types of conceptual thought, Go-rams pa takes into consideration developments subsequent to Sa Paṇ in relation to Tibetan writers' views as to how to understand Dharmakīrti's intent regarding the term sgra don (śabdārtha). Tibetan writers generally accept Dharmakīrti's inclusion of the sgra don qualification, but they vary in their understanding of how the term is to be understood. While not directly identifying the intended target of his criticism, Go-rams pa seemingly includes reference to the definitions developed by Dge 'dun grub pa, Rgyal tshab rje, and Mkhas grub rje of the Dge lugs-Gsang phu tradition. As represented in the second of the four definitions outlined above, Go-rams pa appears to refer to Dge 'dun grub, who set up a definition of conceptual thought that separates sgra don (śabdārtha) as a conjunctive compound (dvandva), to wit, terms (sgra) and objects (don), taking 'term' to signify term-universal (sgra spyi) and 'object' for object-universal (don spyi) (Dge 'dun grub pa 1985, fol. 37). 36 Hence, Dge 'dun grub lays out a definition of conceptual thought as 'a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-(universal) as capable of being associated'; this definition being somewhat based on the P.Vin (Dge 'dun grub ba 1985, fol. 36). 37 Go-rams pa's third example above can be seen to refer to Mkhas grub rje, who, basing his definition on the PV, understands sgra don as a genitive compound (tatpuruṣa), and describes conceptual thought as 'a cognition that apprehends the object (associated with) words' (Mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzango po 1982, fol. 57.a.5). 38 Like Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa comments that these types of conceptual thought should be known as being without distinction (khyad par med pa, abheda) in the sense that all are equally absent whenever a valid case of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) occurs.
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.B. Ascertaining the meaning of 'without error' (Verse III continued)
In examining the meaning of 'without error' (ma 'khrul pa, abhrānta) in the definition of mngon sum (pratyakṣa), Sa Paṇ and subsequently Go-rams pa initially lead off the discussion by discounting three alternate views about the purported meaning of 'without error'. Accordingly, they dismiss the following three explanations of pa'i dang / sgra don 'dzin pa'i dang / don spyi 'dzin pa'i zhe na blo rnams khyad par med par shes par bya'o /.
36 See also Dreyfus 1997, 221 and Tillemans 1999, 238, n. 22 , where the issue of interpreting the sgra don (śabdārtha) is also discussed.
37 Tillemans 1999, 239, n. 22 comments that Rgyal tshab rje also accepted this interpretation of the term sgra don.
38 It should be noted that Mkhas grub dge also strenuously argues against Dge 'dun drub and Rgyal tshab's understanding of sgra don as sgra spyi and don spyi (see Tshad ma sde bdun, fol. 57.a: it is not correct to hold that the words 'term' and 'object' refer to term and object universal).
'without error' (Sa Paṇ's reason for discounting the various explanations has been included parenthetically):
• Some scholars who according to the Vijñānavādin system (rnam rig pa'i grub mtha) accept 'without error' as meaning 'non-deceptive' (mi bslu ba, avisaṃvāda). (Sa Paṇ contends that this is not correct, since non-deceptive is also present with regards to the object of application ('jug yul) of inference (rjes dpag, anumāna).) • Some who accept (pratyakṣa as being 'without error') concerning (ldan pa) the truly existent object (yul bden). (Sa Paṇ contends that in this instance examining direct perception according to the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārtha-satya) is not the heart of the matter, i.e. the relevant point.) • Some who accept 'without error' as a direct perception that is 'without error' regarding the held object (gzung yul 
.4: ma 'khrul pa'i don kha cig rnam rig pa'i grub mtha' ltar mi bslu ba la 'dod pa dang / kha cig yul bden pa dang ldan pa la 'dod pa dang / kha cig gzung yul ma 'khrul pa la 'dod pa ni slob dpon gyi dgongs pa ma yin te mi bslu ba tsam rjes dpag gi 'jug yul la 'ang yod cing / don bden pa brtags
na snying po med cing / gzung yul don byed nus pa la byed na rang rig dang rnal 'byor mngon sum la ma khyab ste /. Cf. Go-rams pa 1975, 126.17-20 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.5-6, where Go-rams pa lays out the same three alternative views that should be discounted, as Sa Paṇ does; Go-rams pa, however, does not feel compelled to repeat the reasons why they are incorrect, which have been previously included by Sa Paṇ.
Concerning the reference in the first bullet to those scholars who relate 'without error' as meaning 'non-deceptive' (mi bslu ba, avisaṃvāda), Sa Paṇ is likely referring to Vinītadeva, who explains in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu 'abhrānta means "without error", that is to say, "non-deceptive" regarding the object attained' ('khrul ba med pa ni ma khrul ba ste / thob bar byed pa'i yul la phyin ci ma log /), de la Vallée Poussin 1907, 40. For further discussion, see also Stewart 1983 , Introduction section, discussing 'Authority and Direct Perception'; and Dreyfus 1997, 349.
Concerning Sa Paṇ's third bullet, which rejects those who accept 'without error' in the definition of direct perception as regarding the (external) held object (gzung yul), Go-rams pa further supports Sa Paṇ's assertion when explaining Svasaṃvedana and Yogi-pratyakṣa; he notes that no external 'held object' is involved in either of these two varieties of perception. Regarding Svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa (rang rig mngon sum), Go-rams pa notes (Go-rams pa 1975, 144.6-13 There are two types kinds of svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa, to wit, a svasaṃavedana-pratyakṣa having a dual appearance and a svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa without a dual appearance. The first one is when a single cognition (blo, buddhi) appears as both the objective aspect, lit. 'held aspect' (grāhyākāra), and the subjective aspect, lit. 'holding aspect' (grāhakākāra), namely, it is just the Somewhat leniently Sa Paṇ comments that the above interpretations are not the intent (dgongs pa) of Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) in the current circumstance, whereas Go-rams pa more directly criticises these interpretations as being contradicted by reasoning (rigs pas gnod pa, yukti-viruddha).
As for the intended purpose of 'without error', both the TMRGRG and TMRGDG highlight that it is the pratyakṣa that is not produced as an errant cognition through the causes of error ('khrul rgyu, vibhramakāraṇa) situated in the sense basis (dbang po, indriya), the one situated on the object (yul, viṣaya), through activity (bya ba, karma), etc. In support of the above, the Sa skya scholars refer to P.Vin, where Dharmakīrti while commenting on I.4a. states:
In that (pratyakṣa), 'without error' is not having error invested through the effect of cataracts, quickly whirling (e.g., a fire brand), travelling on a boat, and confusion, etc. 40 svasaṃvedana with an appearance of a situation that is appearing as the apprehensible appearance to be experienced (gzung bar snang bam yang bya) and what experiences the apprehended appearance ('dzin par snang ba myong byed). The second one is just that part of every cognition which merely experiences its bare nature. Hence, there is no reference to an external 'held object' (gzung yul) in the description of svasaṃvedana. Aligning Dharmakīrti's description of 'without error' with Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa's elaboration, 'the effect of cataracts' can be paired with the error produced through the senses, 'quickly whirling' can be paired with the error produced through the object, and the error resulting from 'travelling on a boat' can be joined with activity. 41 The TMRGDG highlights the possibility that there may be individuals who propose that given the parameters laid out above by Dharmakirit regarding the conditions under which a pratyakṣa can arise as erroneous, then even 'conceptual thought' (rtog pa, vikalpa) could also be considered to be 'without error'; since 'conceptual thought' does not arise from the causes mentioned above. More specifically, Go-rams pa stipulates that others may contend that 'conceptual thought' would be 'without error' because it is not produced as erroneous through those causes of error delimited under Dharmakirit's explanation. Go-rams pa disagrees and notes that the term 'et cetera' (adi, sogs) is included by Dharmakīrti in order to cover other causes of error, such as the error which is 'established by means of "conceptual thought" arisen from the beginningless propensity (thog med bag chags, anādivāsanā)' (to view the world as such and such), and 'that error that is created by habitually perceiving (the world) from time immemorial (thog med pa'i dus can, anādikālina)'. 42
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.C. Ascertaining the purpose of both 'without conceptual thought and without error' (Verse III continued)
When addressing the purpose of both aspects of Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception, Go-rams pa restates the comment he made at the outset of the discussion of the purpose of the defining characteristic of direct perception in terms of a rhetorical du bskor ba dang / grur zhugs pa dang 'khrul pa la sogs pas 'khrul par mi sked cing / zhes gsungs pa ltar / dbang po dang / yul dang / bya ba la sogs pa'i 'khrul rgyus 'khrul par mi skyed pa'o /. Cf. the Sanskrit of Dharmakīrti's comment on P.Vin I.4a: tatra abhrāntam timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramam / 41 Cf. also Dge 'dun grub ba 1985, fol. 38.3-10 where a similar pairing of the four types/causes of error and their manifestations is laid out. Regarding the error resulting from 'travelling on a boat', which is paired with 'activity' (bya ba), this is sometimes explained as an error resulting in location (gnas la yod pa) (as does Dge 'dun grub ba above). See also Wayman 1999, 17 , in his presentation of his translation of Asaṅga's 'Hetuvidyā' section of the Yogācārabhūmi, where the question what is karmabhrānti is asked. The answer is 'the false confidence that is activity where there is no activity, for example, to see a tree moving alongside while holding up a tight fist'. This is similar to the instance where the trees along the shore are mistakenly seen to be moving when one has embarked in a boat; which is the example cited by Dharmottara in his Nyāyabindu-tika when explaining the cause of error found in the place; see Stcherbatsky 1962, 2: 24. 42 Here Go-rams pa is quoting come from PV 'Svārthānumāna' 205.a-b (also occurs in P.Vin 'Parārthānumāna'): anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ (thog me bag chags las byung ba'i / rnam par rtog pas yongs sgrub pa) and PV 'Prat.' 29.c-d: bhrāntiḥ sā anādikalīnadarśanābhyāsanirmitā (gang de 'khrul pa thog med pa'i / dus can mthong goms kyis sprul yin). See Go-rams pa 1975, 127.4-7 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.b.2. question, to wit: are both 'without conceptual thought' and 'without error' intended to eliminate dissimilar types (rigs mi mthun, asajātīya) or are they intended to eliminate misunderstanding (log rtog)? Answering his own question, Go-rams pa notes that actually a cognition that is 'without error' is able eliminate dissimilar types. 43 As to what constitutes those 'dissimilar types' of perception, Go-rams pa earlier delimited them as the cognitions that are produced as erroneous through the causes of error situated in the senses, etc. Sa Paṇ comments that those who say that both aspects of the definition are necessary to eliminate dissimilar types do not know (ma shes pa) the meaning of 'without error'. Clarifying his statement, the TMRGRG adds that in fact all conceptual thought (rtog pa thams cad) is erroneous and just by stating that a cognition is 'without error' also establishes it as 'without conceptual thought'. 44 As a corollary to the above, in a later section of the 'Direct Perception' chapter (Verse 130-31) when examining the erroneous 'semblance of direct perception' (mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣābhāsa), Sa Paṇ states:
All erroneous cognitions are accepted as a semblance of direct perception. 45 Sa Paṇ's comment highlights that Dharmakīrti added the term 'without error' in order to draw distinction between pratyakṣa and pratyakṣābhāsa. Similarly, supporting Sa Paṇ's contention, in his A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, Alex Wayman, utilising Bu-ston's commentary on P.Vin 'Pratyakṣa's' examination of 'semblance of direct perception', notes that Bu-ston's comments indicate that Dharmakīrti added abhrānta to differentiate 'semblance of perception' from 'perception' (Wayman 1999, 160) .
Therefore, both the TMRGRD and TMRGDG support the notion that both characteristics are intended for the purpose of eliminating misunderstandings (log rtog) and highlight two reasons why both 'without conceptual thought' and 'without error' are included by Dharmakīrti. First, Sa Paṇ notes that 'without conceptual thought' in addition to 'without error' is employed to contradict those individuals who mistakenly accept as valid a cognition that is 'without error' regarding the 'held object' (gzung don) while possessing 'conceptual thought'. Go-rams pa narrows down the targets of Sa Paṇ's criticism to the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika (bye brag dang rigs pa can) and others who mistakenly accept the sense cognition (dbang shes, indriya-jñāna) as 'without error' while possessing conceptual thought (rtog pa, kalpanā). 46 Second, Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa note that the term 'without conceptual thought' is included for the purpose of contradicting those who mistakenly consider any knowledge that is 'without error' regarding its object of application ('jug yul, grāhyārtha) to be conclusively established as being 'without error'. Following this line of reasoning, they rhetorically ask whether inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) can also be considered to be 'without error'. 47 As noted previously, according to Dharmakīrti, since inference is accompanied by conceptual thought, it is necessarily also accompanied by error. Thus, even though inference can be considered a pramāṇa in that it is non-deviant with regard to its object of application by having a necessary connection (saṃbandha) with that object, there is error in that conceptual thought functioning by apprehending its own appearance, which is not the object, to be the [actual] object (see Tillemans 1999, 210) .
2.B.1.A.2. The variegation of what is to be defined (mtshon bya, lakṣya)
Go-rams pa indicates that five issues need to be addressed when examining the variegation of what is defined, to wit:
A. the basis (gzhi, ādhāra) on which the variegation is made; B. the essence (ngo bo, svabhāva) of what is variegated; C. the rationale (rgyu mtshan, nimitta) by which the variegation is made; D. the significance of the manner of making the variegation; E. what the proper number of the variegation is.
2.B.1.A.2.A. The basis (gzhi, ādhāra) on which the variegation is made (Verse IV)
Continuing to illustrate the basic role the 'without error' characteristic plays in this system, Sa Paṇ's fourth verse in his 'Direct Perception' chapter delimits 46 A full exploration as to why Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa have identified the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika as the targets for Dharmakīrti including both aspects of the definition of pratyakṣa is beyond the scope of the present effort. It can be briefly noted, however, that Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra (I.4) provides the contextual background for Dharmakīrti's criticism. As laid out in the Nyāya-sūtra, the following four criteria need to be met for a cognition to be perceptual: (a) cognition produced by sense-object contact; (b) nonverbal (avyapadeśya); (c) nonerroneous (avyabhicārin); and (d) definite (or determinate, vyavasāyātmaka). Following Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa lays out the basis on which the variegation of perception is made, stating that it is merely (tsam) a perception that is 'without error'. In commenting on his Verse IV, Sa Paṇ again reiterates that alternatively stating both the 'without error' and 'without conceptual thought' characteristics is just (nyid) utilised with respect to addressing those who misunderstand the proper functioning of a perception, to wit, the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika and others who mistakenly accept the sense cognition as 'without error' while possessing conceptual thought.
2.B.1.A.2.B. The essence (ngo bo, svabhāva) of what is variegated
Both the TMRGRD and TMRGDG identify the well known four-fold division of pratyakṣa according to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system as the essence of the variegation as follows:
• (Outer) sense direct perception (dbang po gyi mngon sum, indriya-pratyakṣa);
• Mental direct perception (yid gyi mngon sum, mānasa-pratyakṣa);
• Introspective direct perception (rang rig gyi mngon sum, svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa);
• Yogic direct perception (rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa).
Presaging the discussion to follow, Sa Paṇ notes that the four perceptions are different from one another with respect to their object (yul, viṣaya) but are the same taking into account the subject (yul can, viṣayin). 49
2.B.1.A.2.C. The rationale (rgyu mtshan, nimitta) by which the variegation is made (Verse V and VI)
Sa Paṇ presents the rationale behind the variegation of pratyakṣa in Verse V and VI of the 'Direct Perception' chapter by stating:
Direct perceptions are sorted in terms of object (yul), support (rten), and person (gang zag). 50 The TMRGRD and TMRGDG similarly explain this verse. In terms of the object, there are two direct perceptions (i.e. indirya and mānasa), which cognise the object by means of an outward-directed cognition (gzhan rig, parasaṃvitti) of the object.
There is introspective direct perception, which is an inward-directed cognition. And finally, in terms of the object there is the yogin's direct perception, which lacks an inner and outer directed cognition of the object. 51 With respect to the support (rten), again there are the two perceptions (i.e. indriya and mānasa) that cognise the external object dependent on the sense organs (dbang po). The introspective direct perception depends only (tsam) on other dependent phenomena (gzhan dbang, paratantra) and the yogin's direct perception dependent on intense contemplation (ting nge, samādhi). In terms of the person (gang zang, pudgala), there are two perceptions: the perception of ordinary people (so skye) and the perception of the Āryas ('phags pa).
2.B.1.A.2.D. The significance of the manner of making the variegation
Go-rams pa notes that the significance concerning how the four direct perceptions are differentiated is not simply a distinction in order to refute their unity, because the four perceptions are discrete things (dngos po, bhāva) able to perform a function, nor for Go-rams pa are they merely different aspects (ldog pa tha dad) of a single entity (ngo bo gcig), because any one of the four perceptions are substantially different from the three other direct perceptions. Nevertheless, Go-rams pa reminds his readers that the significance of the differentiation of the four perceptions is not that they are substantially different, because the three other perceptions (e.g. indriya, mānasa and yogi) are a single entity (ngo bo gcig) with respect to the introspective direct perception (rang rig mngon sum). Therefore, Go-rams pa concludes that while any one of the four perceptions is substantially different (rdzas tha dad) from the three other direct perceptions and the three (indriya, mānasa and yogi) are a single entity (ngo bo gcig) with introspective direct perception, the real significance as to how the four direct perceptions are differentiated 'is that they are different in terms of their object'. 52
2.B.1.A.2.E. What is the proper number of the variegation? (Verse VII and VIII)
Addressing the proper number (grangs) of varieties of direct perception, Sa Paṇ's Verse VII and VIII of the 'Direct Perception' chapter states:
There are four varieties of direct perception in the view of the Sautrāntika, three according to the view of the Vaibhāṣika, and two according to Vijñānavādin. 53 The circumstances regarding the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika appear to be the most straightforward. Both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa acknowledge the fourfold division of pratyakṣa in the case of the Sautrāntika when accepting the external object (phyi rol gyi don zhal gyis bzhes pa). Concerning the Vaibhāṣika, Sa Paṇ's sole comment in this section is simply that 'the Vaibhāṣika do not accept introspection as a direct perception'-leaving sense, mental, and yogi direct perception as the varieties of direct perception accepted by the Vaibhāṣika. Go-rams pa does not deem it necessary to further comment at this point on the Vaibhāṣika's position vis-à-vis their accepted varieties of direct perception.
The situation is not as clear-cut with respect to the Vijñānavādin. Since Sa Paṇ's root text declares that the Vijñānavādin accept a twofold division of direct perception, the first question that arises is which two direct perceptions, according to Sa Paṇ, are accepted by the Vijñānavādin? In setting up the discussion, Go-rams pa hints that the situation is not as simple as it may appear, noting that some scholars have interpreted Sa Paṇ's Verse VII and VIII literally (sgra ji bzhin du); thereby those scholars have incorrectly understood his intent and as a result of their misunderstanding have stated that in the view of the Vijñānavādin sense and mental direct perception are not present, leaving the Sautrāntika as the only position adhering to the fourfold division of pratyakṣa. 54 While Sa Paṇ's auto-commentary eventually notes that Dharmakīrti's final intention is that in the view of the Vijñānavādin other than introspective direct perception and the yogin's direct perception no other valid means of perception is possible; 55 in the preamble building to this conclusion Sa Paṇ also indicates that there is more to the situation than meets the eye in terms of sense and mental direct perception vis-à-vis the Vijñānavādin.
53 See TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23 .18-9 and 228.9-10 respectively: mngon sum bzhi po mdo ste'i lugs / bye brag smra gsum rnam rig gnyis //. See also Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 29b.1-2.
54 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.15-18 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.4: 'di In the discussion surrounding Verse VII and VIII, Sa Paṇ and to a greater degree Go-rams pa unpack their understanding of how one should interpret the correct number of pratyakṣas in terms of the Vijñānavādin, as well as adding further precision regarding the purpose of each of the four accepted pratyakṣas for the Sautrāntika. The issue focuses on how to understand the possible role of and conditions under which sense and mental direct perception can be considered within the Vijñānavādin. Following his Indian predecessors (such as Mokṣākaragupta), Sa Paṇ initiates the discussion by appealing to scriptural authority, quoting from the Saṁyutta Nikāya in an effort to establish a basis for holding sense and mental direct perception as justifiable:
O Bhikṣus, the cognition of form (gzugs, rūpa) is twofold, i.e. that of the eye (mig, cakṣus) and of mind (yid, manas) . 56 Sa Paṇ follows the appeal to scriptural authority with what would seem to be a reference to verses I and II of Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā (dmigs pa brtags pa), where Dignāga states that the atom (rdul phran, paramāṇu), either in aggregation ('dus pa) or in a multitude (bsags pa), cannot be an object of perception. Sa Paṇ presents a would-be questioner (perhaps a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika) who, referring to the early section of Ālambanaparīkṣā, claims that when mental direct perception is not established as a means of valid cognition, then sense direct perception is also not established as a means of valid cognition because of rejecting the notion that the atom (rdul phran, paramāṇu) is the object of perception. 57 While the initial verses 56 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005 , 228.12, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968 : mdo las / dge slong dag gzushes pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / mig dang yid do / zhes gsungs pa'i dgongs pa yin no /. Go-rams pa also cites this verse in a later section of the 'Direct Perception' chapter while providing an in-depth examination of mānasa pratyakṣa in a section entitled 'Identifying the Valid Position' ('thad pa'i phyogs ngos bzung) (for the arising of mental direct perception); see Go-rams pa 1975, 138.11 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 67.b.5) . Cf. Feer 1884 -1904 The same or at least a very similar verse is also cited in the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta and Nyāyabindu ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī, where the Sanskrit can be found (dvābhyāṁ bhikṣavo rūpaṁ dṛśyate cakṣur vijñānena tadākṛṣṭena manovijñāneneti), see Kajiyama 1966, 47, and Stcherbatsky 1909, 26.10, respectively. 57 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.14-5, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.a.6: 'o na yid kyi mngon sums tshad mas mi 'grub bo zhe na / dbang po'i mngon sum yang tshad mas mi 'grub ste / rdul phran 'gog pa'i phyir ro /. In Ālambanaparīkṣā, Verse I-II, Dignāga focuses on demonstrating how atoms (rdul phran, paramāṇu) cannot be the object of perception (blo yi yul du), either in aggregation ('dus pa) or in a multitude (bsags pa). Dignāga is distinguishing between atoms in aggregation or in a multitude and not that there are in fact atoms. Cf. Sastri 1942 . Further on in Gorams pa 1975 , 136.22 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a in the section entitled 'Proving Mental Direct Perception as an Authority' when discussing how despite certain things being true, when considered according to convention, they may not be mentioned as such, Go-rams pa uses the atom as an example as follows:
dper na dbang shes kyi yul rdul phra rab yin yang tha snyad du yul gyi tha snyad mi byed pa bzhin no / For example, the atom is the object of sense cogntion, but in convention it is not mentioned as the object.
(I-V) of the Ālambanaparīkṣā entail an examination of how atoms cannot serve as the object of cognition (blo yi yul du) as part of presenting the opponents' position (pūrva-pakṣa/anya-samaya), Dignāga does not deny that an atomic-object is real and in fact in other texts, such as the PS, is referred to as a svalakṣaṇa. Sa Paṇ follows this objection with a statement indicating the atom can be viewed as a real external-object that plays a casual role along with the sense organ as a cooperating capacity, thereby substantiating the validity of indriya and manasa pratyakṣa for the Vijñānavādin under certain conditions, to wit, 'with the acceptance of the external object (phyi rol gi khas blangs nas), sense direct perception is established'. Under these circumstances, how can one oppose that mental direct perception then apprehends (the accepted external object) immediately after that (sense direct perception). 58 Substantiating Sa Paṇ's claim that the Vijñānavādin (Cittamātra) can also be seen as upholding a view of a fourfold division of pratyakṣa, Go-rams pa specifically identifies Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā (dmigs pa brtags pa) as a source to support this view. Regarding the Ālambanaparīkṣā, Go-rams pa notes that since this work includes an explanation of the three conditions (kyen, pratyaya) of sense direct perception according to the view of the Cittamātra (sems tsam pa), there is the Cittamātra's implicit acceptance of sense direct perception. Continuing, Go rams pa concisely summarises Sa Paṇ's TMRGRG above discussion concerning the connection between sense and mental direct perception by stating that 'when one accepts sense direct perception, then one ought to accept mental direct perception '. 59 Go-rams pa also disagrees with those (a possible reference to followers of Phya pa) who interpret Sa Paṇ's Verse VII and VIII as indicating the number of direct perceptions for each system (Sautrāntika, Vijñānavādin, etc) with respect to those direct perceptions which are 'without error' towards the 'appearing object' (snang yul). Go-rams pa notes that such an interpretation is incorrect because it would require 58 The three conditions (khyen) of sense perception are the object condition (ālambana-pratyaya, dmigs khyen), the controlling condition (adhipati-pratyaya, dgag rkyen), and the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya, de ma thag rkyen). See also Wayman 1999, 282-85 , where Wayman's translation of Tsong-kha pa's Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid mun sel presents an outline of the above three conditions of sense cognitions according to the Cittamātra School.
acceptance by Vijñānavādin that both sense and mental direct perception are 'without error' regarding that 'appearing object' that becomes the object of direct perception. 60 After taking exception to the incorrect manner in which others have interpreted these two verses of Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa lays out what he considers to be the correct understanding of Sa Paṇ's presentation of the proper numbers of varieties of direct perception. Go-rams pa notes that if presented according to the conventional view (tha snyad, vyavahāra), both sense and mental direct perception are accepted by the Vijñānavādin as means of valid cognition concerning the external object (phyir rol gyi don, bāhyārtha). Go-rams pa however points out that the true number of the variegation that is indicated in Sa Paṇ's treatise is being examined according to the ultimate abiding nature (don dam gnas lugs). In this case therefore, neither sense nor mental direct perception can possibly be upheld a means of valid cognition for the external object for the Vijñānavādin. 61 The TMRGDG notes that for the Vijñānavādin, in terms of the ultimate abiding nature, there is only introspective direct perception (rang rig mngon sum, svasaṃvedana-60 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.22-129.4 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.6: kha cig gzhung de'i don / snang yul la ma 'khrul ba'i mngon sum gyi dbang du byas yin zhes gsungs pa yang mi 'thad de / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis / gang la mngon sum du song ba'i snang yul de la / ma 'khrul bar rnam rig pas kyang len dgos pa'i phyir ro /. See Dreyfus 1997, 379 for an overview of Phya pa's (therein referred to as Cha ba) typologies of objects, which in addition to the appearing object (snang yul) includes the held object (gzung yul), the object of application ('jug yul), and the conceived object (zhen yul). Dreyfus notes when comparing the Ge-luk traditions with Phya pa that they 'understand the notion of object realistically, at least as far as perception is concerned. The appearing object of perception is the real object that appears to it' (p. 382). Taking Dreyfus' comment in conjunction with the well-known Buddhist mythological theory of the fixed or six destinies (gati), including the hungry ghosts (preta), men, and gods, all of whom view external objects differently. Using a river as the example, the hungry ghosts see it as full of pus, the gods seeing it as lapis lazuli, and so on. The stream itself was not denied; it is the erroneously reported nature of the external object that is arisen from the beginning less propensity (thod med bag chags, anādivāsanā) to see the world as such and such and the error that is created by habitually perceiving the world from time immemorial (thog med pa'i dus can, anādikālina). Thus for the Cittamātra, sense and mental direct perception would certainly have to contain error vis-a-vis reporting the appearing object (snang yul).
61 Go-rams pa 1975, 129.4 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.1: 'o na gzhung 'di'i dgongs pa ji ltar zhe na / tha snyad kyi dbang du byas na / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis po phyi rol don la tshad mar rnam rig pas kha blangs kyang / 'dir bstan gyi grangs nges ni don dam gnas lugs la dpyod pa'i dbang du byas pa yin la / de'i tshe / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis phyi rol gyi don la tshad mar 'gyur bar mi srid par /. It can be noted that there is no denial of the external object, just that sense and mental direct perception cannot be considered as means of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) for the external object in the ultimate abiding (don dam gnas lugs) sense for the Vijñānavādin. Further, while beyond the scope of this inquiry, in a later section of his commentary on the 'Direct Perception' chapter when discussing the definition of the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya, dmigs khyen), Go-rams pa stipulates that 'the object-condition of the perception (vijñāna) is defined as that "external object" (phyi don) which directly generates the principal image (rnam pa'i cha gtso bor, pradhānākāra) of the object in perception. If applied according to the system of the Vijñānavādin, (the ālayavijñāna) can be substituted for the external object' (see Go-rams pa 1975, 134.10 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969b, fol. 65.b.6). pratyakṣa) regarding its own entity (rang gi ngo bo, svarūpa). Further elaborating, under these circumstances (i.e. as for the ultimate abiding nature), Go-rams pa states that according to the Vijñānavādin the first three direct perceptions (i.e. indriya, mānasa, and svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa) are one and the same in terms of their nature, and they are also the same in terms of their object. And as for the yogin's direct perception (rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa), when it is recognised as introspective direct perception, it is the means of valid cognition regarding the true nature (chos nyid, dharmatā) of the object. In consequence of which, the yogin's direct perception is one and the same nature with introspective direct perception, though it is recognised as different in terms of its object; to wit, it has the true nature of the object as its object. 62 Thus based on the above analysis, Go-rams pa, like Sa Paṇ, also views the twofold variegation of direct perception for the Vijñānavādin indicated in the TMRG Verse VII and VIII as introspective direct perception and the yogin's direct perception.
As for the view of the Sautrāntika, since Sa Paṇ is considering the proper number of direct perceptions from the perspective of the abiding reality (gnas lugs), Go-rams pa again explains that each of the four perceptions is distinct in terms of its object. That is to say:
• introspective direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for the cognition (shes pa, jñāna); • sense direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for the external object (phyi rol gyi don, bāhyārtha); • mental direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition relying on the external object that is a different substance from the object of sense direct perception; and, • the yogin's direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for the right object (yang dag pa'i don, samyag-artha).
Supporting his view, Go-rams pa quotes from Sa Paṇ's Auto-commentary as follows, 'With respect to the view of the Sautrāntika, the proper number of direct 62 Go-rams pa 1975, 129.10 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.2 : rang gi ngo bo la rang rig mngon sum kho nar 'gyur bas / mngon sum dang po gsum ngo bo'i sgo nas kyang gcig cing / yul gyi sgo nas gcig pas / rang rig mngon sum du bzhag la / rnal 'byor mngon sum ni yul chos nyid la tshad ma yin bas rang rig mngon sum dang ngo bo gcig kyang / yul gyi sgo nas tha dad du bzhag go /. (Note: Go-rams pa bsod nams seng ge 1975, 129.15 omits the terminating particle 'go' in 'bzhag go'.) While beyond the current scope of this study, it should be noted that in the Tibetan Grub mtha' (siddhānta) materials there is considerable discussion among Buddhists concerning the division of Yogacarins into two groups: those that follow scripture (āgama-anusārin) and those that follow reason (yukti-anusārin). During this discussion one factor dividing these two group pointed out by Lcang-skya Rol-pa'i rdo-rje in his medium length Grub mtha' is that the yukti-anusārin accept the four kinds of direct perception, that is, sense, mental, introspective, and of the yogin. And the āgama-anusārin rejects introspection while accepting the other three kinds. For further discussion of this topic, see Wayman 1977. perceptions is variegated as four in terms of the object when accepting the presence of the external object'. 63 Summing up the discussion on the proper number of the varieties of direct perception, Go-rams pa concludes by making three points. Concerning introspection (rang rig, svasaṃvedana) and having noted above that introspective direct perception is the means of valid cognition for the cognition, Go-rams pa now points to an additional role for introspection, noting that it should be understood that when one recognises the means of valid cognition-as-result (tshad ma 'bras, pramāṇa-phala) of sense cognition in the second phase of realising means of valid cognition-as-result, then introspection is explained as the result. 64 An extensive discussion of the role of introspection vis-à-vis the means of valid cognition-as-result occurs in a later section of the TMRG, 'Mngon Sum', commencing with Sa Paṇ's Verses 142-45:
Therein, the tenet systems commonly agree that the means of valid cognition-as-result is established as introspection. [However] , it is by the force of our tenet system that we say the cognition of the external object is established as a means of valid cognition-as-result. 65 Furthermore, Go-rams pa notes that one should understand as an essential point regarding only the view of the Sautrāntika, that when the Tshad ma rigs gter root text and auto-commentary divides direct perception as fourfold in terms of the object (yul), acceptance of the external object (phyi don) is implied. And finally, Go-rams pa concludes that if one knows to apply the phrase 'in terms of the object' (not necessarily an external object that should be understood in relation to only the Sautrāntika) at the beginning of the two verses (Verse VII and VIII) of the Tshad ma rigs gter, then all significant points will be self-revealing (rang grol). 66 In conclusion, in the above I hope that I have contributed to laying out the genius, clarity of thought, and economy of language that Sa Paṇ utilised in his effort to refocus and correct various perceived mistakes and misunderstandings that he believed had entered into Tibetans understanding of the epistemological system developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Through just the first eight verses of the TMRG's 'Direct Perception' chapter in conjunction with Sa Paṇ's Auto-commentary and Go-rams pa's sub-commentary, the complexity and interconnection of the discussion in relation to other Buddhist schools and theories of perception is evident. I look forward to exploring and further presenting Sa Paṇ's discussions of other significant topics such as a yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa, rnal 'byor mngon sum), erroneous falsification of direct perception (log phyogs mngon sum, pratyakṣābhāsa), and means of valid cognition as result (tshad ma 'bras bu, pramāṇaphala), to mention just a few.
